Damming the Third World: Multilateral Development Banks, Environmental Diseconomies, and International Reform Pressures on the Lending Process by Plater, Zygmunt J. B.
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 17 
Number 1 Fall - Symposium Article 9 
May 2020 
Damming the Third World: Multilateral Development Banks, 
Environmental Diseconomies, and International Reform Pressures 
on the Lending Process 
Zygmunt J. B. Plater 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Damming the Third World: Multilateral Development Banks, Environmental 
Diseconomies, and International Reform Pressures on the Lending Process, 17 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 121 
(1988). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For 
more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
Damming the Third World: Multilateral
Development Banks, Environmental
Diseconomies, and International Reform
Pressures on the Lending Process
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER*
An "environmental" perspective on multilateral development bank
(MDB) loans presents at least three points of analysis relevant to Third
World development issues. First, it gives some very vivid and instructive
examples of how the international development loan process can go awry.
Second, in a practical sense it demonstrates why and how the lending
process itself requires constructive reform. Third, in reviewing legal ap-
proaches to reform, including recent pressures on MDBs, it helps clarify a
latent debate about the legitimacy of donor-nation pressure on interna-
tional lending institutions.
This article focuses upon World Bank projects and processes, not
only because they provide many useful examples of disastrous develop-
ment loans, but also because in the past two years the World Bank, fol-
lowed by other regional MDBs, has made a dramatic official shift in its
willingness to recognize the seriousness of environmental problems caused
by MDB projects. The new statements of policy and procedure reflect an
attempt to reform the development loan process, to make it more rational
and less prone to environmental disasters - an initiative that so far is
winning mixed reviews.'
This article focuses on the particular example of MDB loans for the
construction of large capital-intensive dam projects.' Dam construction
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. This article is based upon a speech
delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Third World Legal Studies Associa-
tion, held in conjunction with the convention of the American Association of Law Schools,
in Miami, January 8, 1988.
The author is one of those erstwhile Africanists of the 1960's generation who moved
away from active involvement with Third World legal issues upon returning to the United
States. Since returning from Africa, my work has involved questions of environmental law
(including water resources law), and cases involving public works dams, with some limited
involvement with international environmental issues in Japan, India, and South America.
The present analysis is thus written primarily from the perspective of an arm's length ob-
server rather than an active participant in international dam controversies.
I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Albert Bedecarre, Boston College Law School
Class of '90, and the helpful comments of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, Professor Peter Rogers,
and Bruce Rich, Esq.
1. See brief analysis of the evolution of environmental planning considerations in
World Bank development loans, infra text accompanying note 24.
2. Because the article's text is derived from a speech format, it is not extensively foot-
noted. Background data and further information on international dam building projects can
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offers one discreet sector of development assistance initiative that can be
viewed on its own terms. It is an area in which major problems have in-
deed surfaced over the years in World Bank and other MDB projects, and
it is an area in which the banks have encountered vociferous opposition
from a very effective coalition of Western and Third World environmen-
tal non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Dam building offers useful
opportunities to examine how engineering and financing decisions can go
astray, as well as offering a limited opportunity to applaud the Bank's
recent development reform efforts.
This article is organized in three parts. The first part offers a brief
introduction to the environmental perspective, and then sets out a spec-
trum of serious environmental diseconomies which have been caused by
various international dam projects an accounting that requires the analyt-
ical observer to go beyond the usual broad and imprecise rubric of "social
costs" or "economic externalities". The second section of the article fo-
cuses on MDB administrative process: why have problems occurred over
the years in the implementation of international development projects,
and how can decisions be improved? The final section analyzes a range of
available legal approaches for modifying and improving the international
development loan process, focusing on the practical example of several
recent cases of donor-nation pressure on the MDBs. From an observer's
perspective, the most noteworthy recent improvements in the develop-
ment loan process are clearly attributable to external pressures applied to
MDBs by major donor countries under NGO prodding - a development
that may well worry some internationalists.
be found in the following sources: Environmental Performance of the Multilateral Develop-
ment Banks: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Development Institu-
tions and Finance of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (particularly submissions of Bruce Rich, Esq. on behalf of the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund) [hereinafter Hearings]; Aufderheide and Rich, Environmental Re-
form and the Multilateral Banks, Spring 188 WORLD POL. J. 301 (1988); Rich, Funding
Deforestation: Conservation Woes at the World Bank, THE NATION, Jan. 1989 [hereinafter
Deforestation]; Rich, The Multilateral Development Banks, Environmental Policy, and the
United States, 12 ECOLOGY L. Q. 681 (1985) [hereinafter Rich, MDBs]; Address to the
World Resources Institute May 5, 1987 (Washington D.C.) by World Bank President Barber
B. Conable (unpublished summary available from the World Bank); Groups Call for Action
to Block World Bank Loan, NOT MAN APART, August 1988, at 7; International Dams News-
letter, Vol. 1, No. I Winter 1985-86 (all subsequent issues available through the Environ-
mental Policy Center and Earth Island Institute); Rabben, Brazil on the Brink - Land,
Debt, and Democracy, THE NATION, April 30, 1988, at 597; Castantreira, Balbina Goes on
Line, EARTH ISLAND JOURNAL, Fall, 1987; Damming the World, NOT MAN APART, Oct. 1983,
at 10; The World Bank, Environment and Development (1984); BUND FOR UMWELT UND
NATURSCHUTZ,(1987) (available from U.S. Environmental Defense Fund) [hereinafter Fin.
Ecol. Dis.]; Colchester, Hydropower Projects in Central India, in AN END TO LAUGHTER,
(1985); GESELLSCHAFT FOR BEDROHTE VOLKER (1984) [hereinafter Action for Threatened
Peoples].
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I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
DISECONOMIES IN INTERNATIONAL DAM PROJECTS
A. Environmentalism
Two very contrary images of environmentalism will help the reader
understand the particular perspective of environmental analysts and ac-
tivists in their role on the world stage. The first image is a broadly held
generalization, particularly common amongst those in the international
development profession: In the eyes of many promoters, most environ-
mentalists are a small but noisy elite, inexpert, primitive, petulant, opin-
ionated amateurs, unfounded and insubstantial in their analysis, but un-
fortunately all too clever at mobilizing the media in quixotic campaigns to
protect some endangered flower, fish, or dickey bird.' Environmentalists
cannot see the forest for the trees; they are skewed in their vision and
their values. In their criticism of MDB lending, they are simply "Bank-
bashers."
The converse perspective is the environmentalists' view of them-
selves. On one hand, those who work in environmental initiatives know
there is as much ecological diversity within the ranks of those who call
themselves "environmentalists" as there is in a hectare of tropical rain
forest, ranging from scattered cells of bright-eyed nihilists in eco-guerilla
"direct actions", to polite associations of silk-stocking East Coast Brah-
min, noblesse oblige conservationists; from loney guardians of a particular
bog or forest, to advocacy organizations based in New York or Washing-
ton with thousands of members, dealing with dozens of issues around the
country and the world. There are environmental groups dedicated to
calm, rigorous scientific research while others emphasize economic analy-
sis, sociological issues, legal analysis and segmentation, or artistic, histori-
cal, or quasi-religious values. Some are deeply involved in political lobby-
ing, and others adamantly avoid political entanglement; some are
characterized by Establishment sobriety, others by the fervor of camp
meeting populism.
The United States has developed the most substantial and diverse
environmental community; in recent years however, the U.S. example has
been followed by a plethora of similarly diverse organizations in Western
Europe, and in a growing number of Third World nations and localities.
In some cases the distinctions between various groups in the environmen-
tal spectrum may be more defined than differences between a particular
environmental organization and its non-environmental adversary. The en-
vironmental coalition that has induced recent reform pressures on the
MDBs,4 for example, has generally been characterized by its groups' pro-
3. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Plater, Reflections in a
River: Agency Accountability and T.V.A.'s Tellico Dam Project, 49 TENN. L. REV. 747
(1982); Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter, 19 J. op L. REFORM 4 (1986).
4. This coalition was led by several U.S. groups, notably: the Environmental Defense
Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club, and
Rain Forest Action Network. They were joined by: Probe International (Canada), Friends of
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fessionalism, careful fact-finding, rigorous economic and legal analysis,
and subtle political savvy.
On the other hand, there is a common thread that runs through vir-
tually all the differing components of the environmental "movement" -
a concern with values and ecological interconnectedness that displays
practical as well as philosophical coherence. My environmental law stu-
dents were once visited by David Brower, one of the more eminent U.S.
environmental activists, who enjoyed the title role in the book, En-
counters With the Archdruid.5 Standing tall in front of the students,
white-haired and raw-boned with piercing blue eyes, Brower stretched
out his arm, with thumb and forefinger held about two inches apart, and
said: Imagine if you will our entire planet reduced to this, the size of an
egg ... A computer ecologist did some interesting computations for me: If
the planet Earth were reduced to the size of an egg, what do you think its
total mass of air, of atmosphere, would be? And what would be the total
mass of the water that, along with air and sunlight, sustains life on this
Earth?
Based on those computations the sum total of atmosphere veiled
around this egg planet Earth would be equivalent to no more than the
volume of a large pea wrapped around the globe! And the water? That
would be no more than the mass of a large match head, a tiny volume
spread thin, just enough to fill the oceans, rivers and lakes of the world.
Looking at the students, Brower asked, "Thinking of those limits, can
you any longer not believe that our planet is a tremendously vulnera-
ble little system, totally dependent on this fragile tissue of air and
water, a thin fabric of life support made up of all the air and water
the Earth will ever have?"
Brower's egg illustrates environmentalists' common perspective
on environmentalism, an ultimately utilitarian approach in planetary
terms if not project terms, based upon an attempt to make a rational
accounting of all of the real long term residual costs of modern tech-
nology including consideration of economically intangible as well as
tangible values, in a context of limited and fragile resources. It is an
approach characterized by a consistent skepticism about projects that
do not reflect comprehensive overall economic and ecological account-
ing.B From both perspectives, in the view of the development profes-
the Earth and Survival International (Great Britain), Rain Forest Information (W. Ger-
many), and a number of Third World organizations.
5. JOHN MCPHEE, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCHDRUID (1971).
6. Although development interests here and abroad often chafe at environmentalists'
meddling, and seek to characterize it as a narrow and unrealistic aesthetic initiative, the
record reviewed here shows that the engineers and the people who fund them, often need
the cold dose of reality represented by environmental queries. This would allow them to
plan successful developments. In some cases, this will result in scrapping large-ticket capi-
tal-intensive projects. Rational systems require that there be someone built into the process
whose role is the check whether the Emperor is really wearing clothes. Absent such, an
effective component in the MDB process, the environmentalist must take on this role.
Thus, Environmentalism is not viewed by its advocates as a rarified aesthetic concept.
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sion and in their own eyes, environmentalists often appear to be like
little limpets clinging to the coattails of the engineers and financiers
who day in and day out decide what will be accomplished. Developers
consider this constant surveillance of issues by environmentalists to
be nothing less than harassment. To the contrary. of course, Environ-
mentalists view their efforts as broadly helpful. In either event, both
recognize that environmentalists usually remain outsiders to the deci-
sional process.
Nevertheless, environmentalists do pose important questions. En-
vironmental accounting on large dam projects in the Third World is a
case in point, illustrating the MDB process, its problems, and a func-
tional role for environmentalism.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL DISECONOMIES IN INTERNATIONAL DAM PROJECTS
There have been many problems with large-dam development loans
over the years, some well known and some not so well known. Even with-
out adopting a North/South debt-enslavement conspiracy theory, it is
possible to discern projects that have not necessarily improved developing
nations' overall economic positions, where the institutional structure and
momentum of the MDB lending process failed to prevent harmful eco-
nomic programs and projects, and indeed created, fostered, and en-
couraged them.
Most well-read individuals today have a vague notion that large dam
projects have produced some unanticipated problems over the years. The
Aswan Dam is the most familiar example. It was a large reservoir-based
development project that brought schistosomiasis outbreaks and severely-
altered river flows while destroying one of the world's most productive
agricultural zones in the Nile Valley and its delta region.
Environmental problems occur in a remarkably large number of dif-
ferent categories of residual effects, which for our purposes should not
merely be lumped into the minimizing rubric of "social costs" or "exter-
nal costs" as economists often feel compelled to do. Those terms tend to
insulate or depreciate the overall dimensions of indirect costs imposed by
various projects, and, even more imprecisely, imply that at least within
the "internal" terms of a particular development project there is accurate
accounting of potential costs.
Rational analysis is served better by dividing the different categories
of environmental diseconomies into three classes.
The first class would include system effects like the loss of an endan-
gered species, an effect not generally tangible in national or local eco-
This is a minor luxury when weighed against pressing human needs for development, most
environmental issues are based on the activists' insistence on the overall long term account-
ing of real benefits, costs, and alternatives - seeking to make administrative decisions ra-
tional only in terms of human utility. In practice, this usually means that environmental
groups try to pull into an accounting, all the various real costs in order to achieve overall
rationality.
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nomic terms, but affecting human and ecological values, aesthetics, or
planetary health. Thus, Class I diseconomies are less likely to receive con-
sideration from the development profession based on developmental
pragmatics, but are relegated to protective initiatives based on altruistic
principles.
Class II effects involve off-site problems directly caused by a project
that are economically tangible in national or local terms, although often
not considered in MDB project accounting before or after the fact. An
example would be the Aswan Dam's spreading of schistosomiasis.
Class III diseconomies include unforeseen mistakes such as building
nuclear plants on earthquake faults: problems caused by a project itself
that undercut the specific purpose and function of the project and thus
should have been accountable in project planners' own terms of direct
project self-interest. Class III effects demonstrate why it is wrong to re-
gard environmental costs as "external" costs.
Large dams cause diseconomies in all three classes of project effects.
Project Benefits:
Most often, the engineers and planners who design dam-oriented de-
velopment projects are quite accurate in their most obvious and direct
project calculations. The annual volume and flow of a river can be known
quite precisely, as can be the projects exact dimensions, the height from
the bedrock base of the dam to the top of the spillway, creating a power
head that will probably produce the projected capacity of electrical gener-
ation or the projected volume of diverted irrigation flows. In brief,
whatever direct benefits the structure will mechanically produce are
likely, at least in the short term, to be more or less accurately estimated
in the project designing and funding process.7
Project Costs:
Yet logic dictates that the estimated costs of a project are as impor-
tant as the benefits, and a project's costs typically are not fully accounted
for in the MDB project price tag - notwithstanding the chronic overruns
that seem to be inevitable in such projects once underway.
The following catalog of environmental costs is not likely to be repre-
sented in full in any one dam project, but all of the listed diseconomies
have occurred in past projects, including World Bank financed projects. It
is far more likely that many of these costs will be found cumulated in any
7. For a detailed overall benefit-cost study of projects, see Rogers, Planning Without
Facts: A Framework for Economic Evaluation of the Three Gorges Project, (unpublished
paper presented at the December 6, 1986 symposium of the Education and Science Society
in New York). Some past projects have not only experienced environmental diseconomies,
but have resulted in great harms - causing an entire project to be viewed as a mistake. For
example, the Balbino dam in Brazil, completed with World Bank financing. The millions of
dollars spent on such projects may leave the host country in worse economic position than
before. Official observers now admit the Balbino dam to be a "disaster".
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Third World dam project than that none will be found. Sadly enough,
virtually all Third World international development dam projects to date
have suffered from a dysfunctional constrained scope of review which
failed to consider serious direct and indirect environmental diseconomies.
With recent efforts by the World Bank and other regional MDBs to
effect radical improvements in their decision-making processes, the fol-
lowing list may, one hopes, become a checklist of past disasters to be
avoided in the future, rather than an historical prologue for continuing
failures of project planning.
A. Class I Environmental Costs:
1. Displacement of indigenous peoples
Dams in tropical areas often displace extremely vulnerable indige-
nous cultures.8 The actual number of persons forced from their ancestral
homes may be relatively small, which coupled with the fact that they are
often primitive or minority tribes further diminishes the attention paid
them by national and international development officials. For some cul-
tures and some peoples, however, the dislocation means death. The
Bayano Dam in Panama eliminated 80% of the settled villages of the
Cuna Indians. As with the Tucurui Dam in Brazil (chronicled in the semi-
fictional movie "The Emerald Forest") some displaced persons from dam
areas have been pushed into the territory of enemy peoples, leading to
the decimation of tribal warfare. The dislocated indigenous peoples, who
may never have received notice from national authorities prior to the rise
of impounded waters in their homelands, often lose their religious culture
as well, since many such peoples are deistic and intimately tied to the
physical features of their environment.
In the forced migrations of both primitive and modernized dislocates,
there can be serious disruption of social and economic life, the straining
or splitting of family ties, often producing disassociated personality traits,
accompanied by alcoholism or other anti-social effects, the migration of
destitute individuals to cities, and so on. The numbers of dispossessed
may in some cases be quite large. The Xingu Dams currently being urged
upon on the World Bank by some of its staff and by the government of
Brazil, would flood more than 4,000 square kilometers. The Narmada
Dams project in India would ultimately displace more than 1.5 million
people, in a process that has already begun with its first dam, the Sardar
Sarovar Dam which is now in the process of dispossessing 70,000.'
Boghdat (Indira Sarovar) Dam also in India would displace tens of
thousands more.'0 Even these large numbers, however, are often treated
8. J.C.N. Paul, International Development Agencies, Human Rights and Humane
Development Projects, 17 DEN. J. OF INT'L. L. & POL'Y 67 (1989).
9. The ousted Indians who had legal title were promised title to land elsewhere, but
the program has worked poorly to date. They have been left in many cases with non arable
land that is not irrigated, a further irony since irrigation is a posited benefit of the dam.
10. It was recently reported that the Indian government has formally asked the World
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as relatively insignificant by the national and MDB development officials
who plan the projects. After all, the Indian subcontinent now has 783 mil-
lion people and will have over a billion by the year 2000. The "oustees" as
they are officially termed represent little political consequence; they are
small tribal and ethnic minorities in the vast Indian state.
2. Rare and Endangered Wildlife
In addition to the loss of habitat for wildlife,11 generally, the elimina-
tion of river valleys often destroys the last refuge of endangered species.
The Indira Sarovar Dam would eliminate a major part of some of India's
most endangered species, including the Bengal tiger, the mouse deer, the
sloth bear, a particular species of buffalo, and a giant squirrel species,
while generating only 106 megawatts (MW) of electricity. The Nam
Choan Dam on the River Kwai Yai in Thailand will eliminate the six
rarest animal species in that nation. Rare plant species are also typically
lost in the flooding of a river. Because they seem to represent only aes-
thetic values of a rather recherche' elite, these costs are of little moment
to development planners and financiers. In fact there is a utilitarian argu-
ment to be made for the preservation of endangered species - that if we
don't preserve them we lose possible future knowledge about important
medicines and chemical processes, the structure of which will never be
discovered if we throw away the natural models, "like burning a book
before we've learned to read it." Unfortunately, such arguments do not
present immediate fiscal payoffs, so the preservation of rare and endan-
gered wildlife is typically resigned to the status of a philosophic ideal,
honored in the breach.
3. Archaeological Losses
Over aeons past, human settlements have usually been located along
rivers, hence major human archaeological sites are likely to be lost when a
river is dammed. In the proposed Usamacinta Dam project along the
Mexican-Guatemalan border, there appear to be many unexplored Mayan
sites that will never be seen and understood before they are forever swal-
lowed up under the waters and mud of another reservoir. As U.S. environ-
mentalists have learned, archaeological sites do not possess direct eco-
nomic value in terms relevant to the development planners who
undertake reservoir projects, so their loss is not considered to present
much of a utilitarian argument for negative accounting.
B. Class II Environmental Costs
This is the area of project-cause diseconomies which is most often
Bank to cancel the Indira Sarovar Dam project based upon re-evaluations that national
interests were served better without it. 3 EARTH ISLAND J. No. 4, at 13 (Fall 1988).
11. The habitat of elephants in Southern India is being flooded. In the Kerala State,
elephant migratory routes are being diverted by the reservoirs and canals associated with
dam projects. As well, the other six new dam projects planned for Kerala will destroy much
of the area's remaining forest habitat.
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covered by revisionist resource economists, and includes by far the long-
est checklist of problems:
1. Deforestation
Tropical forests usually represent a major national asset in sustaina-
ble timber resource supply, as well as constituting a major source of oxy-
gen recharge and ecosystem maintenance. The world's tropical forests,
however, are being eliminated at a rate of one to two percent a year under
the onslaught of slash-and-burn agriculture and national transmigration
campaigns often funded by MDBs.' 2 Dams accelerate the process by re-
moving major segments of tropical forests, often with little relation to the
scope of benefits provided. The Balbina Dam in Brazil, which has sacri-
ficed 2430 square kilometers of rain forest in order to generate only 125
megawatts of power, has been described as a "disaster" by the Brazilian
economics ministry that renamed it even before it has become opera-
tional. The project was completed with a World Bank energy sector loan
at a cost of US $800 million.
2. Water quality effects
Beyond the acidification of impounded waters referred to below,
water quality behind dams typically suffers serious degradation. Even if
the muddiness and suspended solids precipitate out in the sedimentation
process, impounded water is typically loaded with nutrients. When its
flows are further warmed by sunlight, it often blossoms into a thick algal
soup, with substantial deoxygenation and proliferation of waterweed.
Though fish populations often increase dramatically in the first few years
of an impoundment's life, the disturbed balance of the riverine ecosystem
typically makes fish populations crash five to ten years after project com-
pletion and waterweed and algae take over the impoundment. Chemical
herbicides can be used to attempt to control the waterweed problem, but
these cost money and create major potential local health hazards as a
further spin-off effect.
Furthermore, downstream effects of dams also cause major changes
in the fish life of a river system. As in the case of the Three Gorges Dam
in China, there may be a threat of losing nutrients and historical temper-
ature conditions down river as well as an increase in saturated nitrogen
problems caused by high dams that may give downstream fish "the
bends," engorging their organs with nitrogen bubbles that kill them.
3. Other down river effects
As the Aswan Dam illustrated most familiarly, the impoundment of a
river eliminates ancient flooding cycles which typically have been built
into the ecological and human balance of downstream river valley uses.
The lack of seasonal floods can eliminate the re-fertilizing effect of sedi-
ment deposition; without the recharge from upstream erosion, land adja-
12. Fin. Eco. Dis., supra note 2, at 4.
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cent to the downstream sediment flow is cut away and disappears, partic-
ularly in the estuaries where entire deltas can slowly dissipate.' 3
4. Seismic effects and mudslides
The collection of a large mass of water accumulates immense weight
on the area of the dam site and impoundment, weight so unnatural that it
may actually throw off the subterranean geological balance of a region,
triggering earthquakes and other seismic effects. Mud slides may also re-
duce the effect of the impoundment, triggered by erosion undercutting or
by destabilization caused by human deforestation efforts attracted by the
reservoir development itself.
5. Human dislocation effects
As noted above in the case of indigenous peoples, the dislocation of
human settlements can pose serious problems to the inhabitants involved.
There are also tangible indirect economic costs that may be felt in na-
tional and regional terms, as people are shifted from more fertile to less
fertile lands, and packed into higher density populations.
6. Disease
The spread of the snail-borne schistosomiasis bilharzia parasite in
the Aswan system is well known. Dams cause diseases in a broad range of
cases including, in addition to schistosomiasis, the spread of onocheriasis
or river blindness, and increased exposure to malaria. The Tehri dam
project has recently been blamed for the exposure of more than eight mil-
lion people to malaria parasites, in a residual effect that had been known
to health scientists at least since Ghana's Volta dam project which was
completed in 1959, two decades earlier. The health effects caused by
dams are often accentuated by the fact that they occur in regions far re-
moved established health care supply. Nevertheless, they do not seem to
attract the prior attention of project planners.
7. Irrigation problems
Schistosomiasis and other waterborne diseases are carried by the irri-
gation systems of dam projects. Other serious diseconomies can occur in
irrigation programs as well. Lands which are irrigated, especially in hot
climates, tend to concentrate whatever mineral salts exist in the river
water, thereby producing an increasingly salinized soil system through
evaporation. India's Punjab has large sections of once-arable land now
salted by intense irrigation.14 In other cases, as in the Kiambere Dam and
Bura irrigation projects on Kenya's Tana River, the irrigated lands may
turn out to be unsuitable for the intensive levels of irrigated agriculture
posited by the engineers as the basis for irrigation benefits. The World
13. Like Aswan, the Three Gorges Dam will cause coastal erosion and saltwater intru-
sion problems, id. at 12-13.
14. See Gesellschaft fir Bedrohte Valker, supra note 2.
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Bank's Tana River project created less than half the irrigable hectares it
was originally planned to develop, seriously diminishing the benefits
promised to the dislocated populations, and raising the cost of those ben-
efits to an average of more than US $20,000 per household.
8. Sabotage potential
Another major potentially catastrophic diseconomy which typically is
not discussed by project planners is that the focus of so much capital,
technology, and pent-up hydrologic pressure at one location increases the
incentives for, and possibilities of sabotage. A high dam more than 200
meters tall may be less than 10 meters thick in poured concrete at its
base. One car bomb driven over the dam anywhere along its up river side
could wipe out the investment as well as the downstream population, cit-
ies, and economy."5 Even without active sabotage, dams may contribute
seriously to civil unrest. Frustration and anger against the Chico Dam
plans in Ferdinand Marcos' Philippines were apparently the main reason
that many local peasants and tribe members (whose political affiliation
previously had been toward the Presbyterian missionary church) turned
toward the communist New Peoples Army.
9. Class dislocation
Other politico-economic effects of big dams de-stabilize human social
ecology as well as natural ecology. Poor people most often suffer the
losses of large dam projects, while the more modernized and wealthier
sectors of the population typically reap the benefits of dam construction.
The natural tensions flowing from such situations can have substantial
effects.
10. Dysfunctional Settlement Patterns
When a dam goes into an area, it typically attracts hordes of un-
skilled laborers who migrate from other areas of the country. As in the
Brazilian projects, the immigrants often exacerbate problems by killing or
exploiting the indigenous residents of the region, setting up shanty towns,
establishing settlements lacking in government services, and practicing a
form of agriculture that may accelerate the deterioration of land quality.
Increased inappropriate agricultural practices, such as slash and burn ag-
riculture and slope farming, may also drastically increase sediment loads
pouring into the impoundments.
11. Loss of Foregone Development Assets
Implicit in a number of the foregoing categories is the fact that dams
not only eliminate particular assets and resources located in their im-
poundment areas, but also eliminate whatever potential there was for ap-
propriate economic development based upon those assets. The loss of fer-
tile soils is a classic example. The most fertile soils of any region typically
15. The only recorded instance of this type of sabotage occurred in World War II.
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are those lying in the river valleys, and these are the soils which will be
completely eliminated as a useful national resource by the effects of an
impoundment. The fertility of the soils, rather than crop-raising, then
contributes to the dysfunctional biological oxygen demand and algal pol-
lution effects of the impoundment. In this regard it is politically under-
standable why engineering and feasibility studies for large dams never
include agricultural maps classifying the quality of soils that will be lost
under the impoundments. In the same way, they rarely include maps
showing archaeological losses, nor losses of mineral deposits which will be
placed under water. Typically, project planning maps cover only the dis-
creet towns and commercial centers existing within the projected reser-
voir areas, entities which obviously and unavoidably will require removal
operations. To register the existence of valuable assets to be lost in the
project area would directly undercut the project's cost-benefit ratios, and
hence is counter intuitive to development planners.
12. Cumulative effects
The practical reality of a large dam project is that many of the fore-
going costs have cumulative synergistic effects. The biological, human, so-
cial, and economic effects of a series of dam projects in a region can cause
qualitatively greater compounded problems, as populations grow more
densely settled, on less fertile ground, with more susceptibility to disease,
and less availability of food.
13. Alternative Technologies Avoided
Finally, a further logical loss caused by major capital focus on dam
projects is that they foreclose a nation's ability to undertake alternative
technologies for development. The $500 million Nam Choan Dam in
Thailand will cause a host of environmental problems, while the cost of
its construction and its electrical power supply system will prevent Thai-
land from investing in cogeneration technology. Cogeneration could have
produced more gigawatt hours than the dam for only one-fourth the dam
project's cost, by providing appropriate generation facilities in conjunc-
tion with the boilers of already-existing sugar processing plants through-
out the country."6 In 1986 it was predicted that electricity consumption
by major power users in Brazil could be cut 30% by the year 2000
through energy conservation and efficiency measures. Such programs
would cost $10 billion compared to the $44 billion that building the un-
necessary 22,000 megawatts of generating power would cost. The institu-
tional initiative and bureaucratic mass represented by dam projects fore-
close the implementation of potentially more beneficial national
development strategies, and the resultant costs can be tangible and
cumulative.
Further, dam projects may produce benefits that are not particularly
needed by a nation, and may promote inappropriate low-multiplier ex-
16. Hearings, supra note 2 (statement by Bruce Rich).
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ploitive industries. The Bakun Dam in Sarawak, besides eliminating the
homes of five thousand tribal people and contributing to serious defores-
tation problems, is being built as a location for the Reynolds Aluminum
Co. facilities which were prevented by pollution laws from expanding op-
erations along the Elbe River in the Federal Republic of Germany. Reyn-
olds will accordingly move its operations and its pollution to the Third
World, at Bakun Dam.
C. Class III Environmental Costs
It is extraordinary to discover that a major environmental category of
project defects that are quite serious, quite foreseeable, and not at all
"external" to project accounting, have nevertheless regularly escaped the
prior attention, and subsequently haunted the project efforts, of interna-
tional dam builders.
1. Sedimentation
Rivers carry suspended solids eroded from upstream in their water-
sheds. When the flow of a river is slowed behind a dam, the soils and
sands carried by the water precipitate down, and can fill up a reservoir
impoundment area with remarkable speed. One large project on the Yel-
low River in China (a Soviet project), so miscalculated the sedimentation
rate that the dam was filled up with mud deposits before it was even
finished. It now stands as an embarrassing albatross, the river flowing
straight over its spillway with no effective water storage impoundment
effect. The Tehri Dam in India was planned to produce benefits over a
serviceable life of 100 years. Because of sedimentation, it currently is
likely to be filled up in thirty to forty years. The Tarbela Dam in Paki-
stan completed in the 1970's will have mud levels reaching its hydroelec-
tric intakes by 1992, requiring multi-million dollar retro-fitting is an at-
tempt to rectify the situation. The $20 billion Three Gorges Dam project
in China risks massive sedimentation from its impoundment effect on the
muddy Yangtze River. This sedimentation is unlikely to be prevented by
recently-designed diversion tunnels near the dam site. Moreover, sedi-
mentation turns out to be a problem that is not restricted to areas nearest
the dam. Waters slow far upstream where they enter the impoundment,
in some cases beginning to deposit their sediment loads a hundred miles
from the dam structure itself, causing obstructions and water elevations
unforeseen by the engineers.1"
17. When river waters deposit their suspended solids at the upstream end of a reser-
voir, they form large sand bars that rise toward the level of the reservoir itself. Because the
suspended grains of sand and soil interlock upon deposition, they do not dislodge by in-
creased water flows on the upper surface. Accordingly, the "hump" of deposited sediments
expands, and forces the waters to rise over it causing further up river sediment deposits. As
this process continues, the upstream elevation of the reservoir may rise as much as a meter
higher than top of the reservoir causing extreme flooding. This changes the hydrologic char-
acteristics of the planned impoundment as well. Interview with Dr. Philip Williams, in
Washington, D.C. (April 18, 1987) (Dr. Williams is a freelance hydrolocist).
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Sedimentation also causes a large number of indirect Class II dis-
economies that are typically ignored by feasibility studies. Because sedi-
mentation so seriously eliminates water storage capacity, cutting down on
hydroelectric and irrigation potential, it is simply extraordinary that engi-
neering feasibility studies can repeatedly ignore or underestimate its
effects.
2. Scour and other structural effects
Large dams produce downstream discharges of tremendous force,
which can cause unforeseen destructive effects to the dam structures
themselves. The Tarbela dam had a concrete spillway that produced flows
strong enough to cut the spillway itself away on the downstream side,
requiring construction of a massive deflector system rushed into place to
control the destructive process.
3. Destructive water quality
Large dams typically cause major off site Class II water quality con-
sequences. Where large amounts of trees and vegetation were simply in-
undated without being removed from the reservoir area prior to impound-
ment, there is a marked increase in the acidity of the river's waters, which
not only has ecological effects but also causes extensive corrosion of hy-
droelectric turbines so that they can be used for only a fraction of their
normal working lives. This happens in a number of tropical dams, partic-
ularly large shallow impoundments like Brazil's Tucurui or Balbina dams.
Drifting vegetation and logs clog turbines and spillways in a long-continu-
ing process in which the organic materials of the impoundment area
break up and slowly drift downstream.
4. Structural failure
Approximately one percent of the world's dams actually do fail,
sometimes because their bedrock geology was not sufficiently studied (as
with the Teton Dam in the United States). In others seismic effects are
generated by the dams themselves, by having such huge masses of water
collected in fragile geological zones. These obvious and direct Class III
costs have often been used by environmentalists to build cases for modifi-
cation or abandonment of international dam projects. Though they re-
present serious concerns, including spill over effects into more extended
Class II diseconomies, the momentum of the development process still
produces contemporary dam project designs without taking sufficient ac-
count of even these most direct project problems. This is most perplexing,
in light of the promoters' purported project orientation.
Summary: MDB Dam Projects Cause Serious Real Environmental
Costs
In sum, the catalog of potential and existing problems caused by
large dam projects is sobering, and would seem to require logical consid-
eration along with the glowing promises of development that typically ac-
company such proposals. Serious environmental problems do occur. The
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World Bank has been a major part of the problem, spending $30 billion to
date for large dams in the Third World, with at least 400,000 involunta-
rily displaced persons dislocated from reservoir impoundment areas since
1979. Despite recent improvements in World Bank policy, another 1.5
million persons in India's Narmada Project alone may have to leave. In-
deed, the momentum of the World Bank lending process over the past
decades not only failed to prevent but appears to have created, fostered,
and encouraged diseconomic projects in a number of Third World
nations.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND REFORMS
A. The Causes of the Problems
Faced with the preceding catalogue of diseconomies and their serious
cumulative effects, the question is how such problems could have oc-
curred? In many cases in the past, the answer seems to be that MDBs, to
a major degree, simply ignored these potential diseconomies in their large
dam development projects. The engineers and financial development
planners who hypothesized and created projects did not take account of a
wide array of negative economic effects, tangible as well as intangible. At
another level, however, the question must be asked why the process did
so ignore predictable and measurably substantial diseconomies. To
surmise how the international lending process may go awry, it is relevant
to view the process from an environmentalist observer's perspective. To
an environmentalist, the problem comes down to the fact that the MDB
development loan process is a closed system which quite naturally resists
consideration of the negative consequences of its own development
mission.
A large dam project can be born in a number of different ways, by
the request of a host nation government, by the suggestion of interna-
tional engineering and construction companies which often lobby Third
World governments to urge them to request dams. If one goes back
through project histories, however, the primary project initiators in many
cases are the multi-lateral development bank's staffers themselves. Bank
staff constantly review conditions in client regions and, as in the case of
the World Bank, prepare "sector analyses" which hypothesize a variety of
different development projects which may be attractive opportunities for
World Bank loans.
Already environmentalist observers would assert that there is a prob-
lem. Within the World Bank, staffers have "lending targets", which are
levels of monetary lending that the Bank wishes to achieve in a given
year. These lending targets are typically increased annually by the Bank's
management. This form of incentive loads the dice in favor of large capi-
tal-intensive projects and against lower-budget alternatives that might ul-
timately prove to be more fitting development initiatives considering the
needs of target nations. Appropriate lower-tech alternatives may exist,
but may take as much time and effort in their preparation as plans for
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large projects. Low tech projects include agricultural cooperative systems,
decentralized low-technology production facilities, public education, low
mechanization modern agriculture, and other decentralized infrastructure
projects. To some MDB staff, it surely must be more enticing to use their
time to produce a multimillion dollar dam.
Once a dam project is hypothesized and given a name ("identified" in
World Bank parlance) it already begins to take on a life of its own. The
host country makes a formal request for MDB consideration of the dam
project. A sign of the realities of project planning is that in some cases
the host country government may not be actively involved with the prep-
aration of its own request, and may get to see it as prepared by the MDB
staff only shortly before the time the formal request is actually made.
Within the MDB as well as the host nation, the name gives the project a
concrete identity. It becomes "the Dunkoro Dam Project", and the con-
cept of naming is clear: a particular place, a particular kind of project, a
known development commodity, a particularly highly-focused form of
capital investment, and a particular set of stirring development images -
mighty piers of concrete, thundering spillways, clouds of white spume
with electrical generation towers in the background.
Once BCntified", the proposed dam project goes into the preparation
feasibility study stages preparing and processing a "project brief". 8 This
is very much a closed process and typically carried out by MDB staff and/
or working groups from engineering firms involved in the development
profession. There is typically no input whatsoever from those who will be
most directly effected by the dam proposal, and often very little input
from the host country government. Feasibility studies tend to be con-
struction analyses done by the potential construction interests. For in-
stance, the feasibility study for the Three Gorges Dam in China was pre-
pared by a consortium of Canadian corporations who were likely to be
prime candidates for the construction of the dam itself. Multinational
contractors are an intimate part of the development profession, and typi-
cally play an active role within the MDB planning process. The graphics
prepared in the feasibility studies incorporate the shortcomings noted in
the environmental overview above by tending to focus on the dam struc-
ture itself and its reservoir impoundment, on projected power demand
curves and repayment schedules. The studies do not include maps of the
natural assets that will be eliminated by the project, no soil maps showing
the fertile soils that will be inundated, with little or no attempt to assess
intangible costs and potential development assets foregone. Generally,
feasibility studies tend to prove the feasibility of the projects as
hypothesized.
After the identification and preparation stages in the project cycle,
the dam proposal passes to the project appraisal report stage. At this
point the staff takes the initial feasibility studies and prepares an overall
18. See generally, The World Bank, The Project Cycle (1987).
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presentation of the project for the Board, typically including an overall
cost-benefit assessment. Prior to 1987, this appraisal stage was the only
occasion where the small environmental staff of the World Bank was re-
quired to have any formal involvement in the project analysis process.
Unfortunately, project appraisal reports replicate much of the same mis-
sion momentum discernible in prior stages of the process. From the per-
spective of outside observers, environmental analysts, and resource econo-
mists, the benefit projections typically tend to expand estimated potential
benefits, and constrain the range and magnitude of estimated direct and
indirect project costs. The environmental inputs and commentary on
projects at this stage tend to be rather flaccid and forlorn. In the case of
the Nam Choan Dam on the River Kwai Yai, the environmental staff
noted the presence of six endangered species, yet was only able to insert
the comment that these rarest species, "will be forced to move else-
where". The tone of the environmental staff was resigned to the inevita-
bility of project completion, positing a biological relocation which in sci-
entific terms was highly unlikely to be successful.
In some cases projected benefits do not aggregate sufficient amounts
to justify projected costs. World Bank project appraisal reports have oc-
casionally based their subsequent positive judgments that a project
should move forward on the assertion that the dam would create substan-
tial amounts of "unquantified benefits." This rationale is paralleled by
American pork barrel construction agencies which claim intangible multi-
plier effects on the plus side of the ledger while typically avoiding consid-
eration of unquantified negatives.
In some cases, as with the Narmada project, the host country minis-
tries will promote the development loan, while by-passing normal domes-
tic review by those ministries that might raise questions regarding indige-
nous peoples, population resettlement problems, and environmental
impacts. In the Narmada case the government of India had not issued its
required environmental clearance prior to project approval. The necessary
studies had not been made, yet the environment ministry was pressured
into making "preliminary approval" without a factual record, thus per-
mitting the loan to be executed.
Prior to final loan commitment, a project must be approved by the
Board of Directors. By this time the process has gone from "lending tar-
get", through increasing institutional investment in the production of the
dam proposal, and substantial momentum has been generated within the
MDB. It is little wonder that the executive directors rarely if ever have
refused to approve such projects, absent extraordinary external
pressures.'
19. Some environmental observers argue that the boards of directors that represent
donor nations (i.e. the Executive directors) consistently defer to the staff on major loans
and, therefore, exercise little control over the MDB's. According to some sources within the
profession, the members of the dam building fraternity all carry around a handbook listing
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B. An environmental perspective on the process
Looking at this development process, environmental analysts would
note the institutional mission's orientation throughout the stages of pro-
ject development which narrows the scope of planning considerations and
makes the ultimate project a foregone conclusion. Throughout the process
the development loan is dominated by the engineering perspective -
namely, what can be done physically, with existing technology - and the
multifaceted inducements of large capital-intensive projects. There are
institutional benefits for all the varied interests in the development pro-
fession, for multinational construction corporations and their home gov-
ernments, (Italy and France, for example, have often taken a strong role
in encouraging construction of such large projects by their own nationals),
for promotional "insiders" within the host country (development minis-
tries and those interests which will profit most directly in fiscal and polit-
ical terms from the project activity), and for the MDB itself. The active
participants in the formation and development of the particular project
become invested in its progress. The participating interests will profit ei-
ther in fiscal terms or in mission terms with a sense of accomplishment
for having built a particular large dam.
Environmentalists would analyze this problem as an immensely pow-
erful decisional process run entirely by "insiders" whose direct motiva-
tions (profit, institutional momentum, political power accrued, etc.) are
not directly tied to the overall best rational development of the particular
country or region. The main motivator for most participants in the pro-
cess is unlikely to be "doing what is best for Gabon." Environmentalists
would assert that Gabon's particular national needs merely serve as an
opportunity for the engine of the development apparatus to do its thing.
Hence, the focus is on building the largest possible projects, with an aver-
sion to low-tech low-budget projects like investment in education, social
infrastructure, and decentralized production. Environmental critics recog-
nize, that focus on rational accounting may actually miss the real motiva-
tions of some of the development establishment as it applies to a particu-
lar project. Rationality is not necessarily the dominating internal drive.
The altruistic desire to transfer maximum benefits to a needy people is
not always the dominating motive for large capital-intensive project pro-
moters. The self-serving motivations of human nature are what environ-
mentalists see, and to some extent there may be truth in the observation.
Human organizations seek to perpetuate themselves. There is a need to
keep sustaining and expanding activity to justify organizational existence.
There is ego gratification the image of something very large that has re-
sulted from one's efforts. Profits for some of the actors in the develop-
ment process are certainly a motivation. In some cases involving develop-
ing countries, corruption may help push along projects that involve
billions of dollars. There is also a sort of engineer's technological impera-
the world's biggest dams, and spend their time publishing papers in an attempt to prove
theirs is the biggest.
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tive, "what can be built must be built". In the case of dams, moreover,
there may even be a touch of atavistic magic. There is something visceral
in the pleasure that comes from making nature do one's work, throwing
up a fragile barrier before the forces of a river's hydraulic power, watch-
ing the river tamed from raging torrent to placid pond, rising up behind a
man-made wall. There is also something of an engineering competition.
The largest power output dam in the world, Itaipu in Brazil, generates
about 11000 megawatts (MW). When it became clear that raising the
planned height of the Three Gorges Dam in China could make it the larg-
est generator dam in the world (13,000 MW), the project's engineers
planned to substantially increase the dam's originally - hypothesized ele-
vation. Since then, the planners for the dam at Xingu in Brazil are meet-
ing the Three Gorges challenge, apparently planning their dam so that
theirs can be the biggest.20
C. Reforms and Reformers
It may well be that the environmental perspective is unnecessarily
jaundiced. The record of MDB development loans for large dam projects
over the years, however, continuing in the present and projected into the
immediate future, indicates that serious problems indeed do occur. Devel-
opment initiatives with serious diseconomies are not only not prevented,
but are born, nurtured, and pushed to the fruition by the MDB develop-
ment lending mechanism over-capitalized and under-planned. It is thus
altogether likely that some of these dam projects should not, if there were
an overall rational accounting, be built, while others should be under-
taken only with very severe modifications and mitigation built into the
project proposals.
Only recently has such overall rational accounting been encouraged
within the MDB process itself. Pressures for reform have been generated
not from within the MDB structure or within the development profes-
sion, but by external reformers, almost exclusively non-governmental or-
ganizations in affected Third World regions and similar interest groups in
the developed nations. The coalition that mobilized reform pressures
upon MDB development lending was initially put together by representa-
tives of several U.S. environmental groups that had developed extensive
legal and political expertise in the course of fifteen years of domestic en-
vironmental initiatives, many, as it happens, involved water projects.
These groups included the Environmental Defense Fund, the Environ-
mental Policy Institute, the National Resources Defense Council, Sierra
Club, National Wildlife Federation, Friends of the Earth, and Rain forest
Action Network. Some of these groups had occasional international ex-
20. According to one source within the profession who would rather not be quoted by
name, "the members of the dam building fraternity all carry around with them this hand-
book listing the world's biggest dams; they're forever publishing papers trying to prove that
theirs is the biggest - the tallest, the widest, the most massive, the biggest earth-fill, most
water impounded, highest generative capacity, etc."
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periences, but the MDB reform effort was notable for its comprehensive-
ness, persistence, and international networking. It soon was joined by the
Canadian Probe International, the British branches of Friends of the
Earth and Survival International, the West German Regenwald (Rain for-
est) Information, plus a critically important number of Third World
NGOs which formed to resist local development projects and joined the
network, sometimes at the risk of lives and safety.2 1
This coalition began to build an analytical factual record detailing
the destructive consequences and diseconomies of the MDB's neoclassical
economics approach to development lending. In the case of dams, they
collected examples of cases involving most of the kinds of project disecon-
omies noted earlier. The strategy was to focus pressure on the World
Bank, figuring that it was potentially more responsive than the host coun-
tries or the smaller regional MDBs, and was vulnerable in the political
context of the U.S. and many Western donor nations. The World Bank
did not have a developed or extensive political constituency within the
U.S. Congress or European parliaments. In functional terms, the NGO
coalition urged a series of changes in the way MDBs planned their devel-
opment project, including:
1. Early overview analysis
A meaningful, comprehensive, realistic hard look, at an early stage of
project analysis, incorporating a sufficient rational overview so that
projects which make little overall sense can be filtered out of the process
quickly, before they gather institutional investment and momentum.
2. Active open consideration of alternatives
One of the major problems that reformers see in the process is that
once the MDB staff and development interests have focused on a particu-
lar high-technology, highly capitalized project idea, they systematically
avoid considering ranges of alternatives that might preclude the adoption
of the proposed dam. Rational cost-benefit analysis development plan-
ning can only be done in a context of considering common sense alterna-
tives to proposals. Some form of environmental impact statement process,
reviewable within the agency and by external observers, is useful in at-
tempting to assure that the indirect intangible or long term diffuse and
cumulative diseconomies of a project will be considered along with the
direct projected benefits normally featured in feasibility studies.
Open information is part of a rational process. MDBs have character-
istically kept their data confidential and inaccessible while projects were
brought to the point of construction. Nevertheless, the computer profes-
sion reminds us of the epigram "garbage-in-garbage-out"; a decisional
process can only be as good as the range and accuracy of the data sup-
plied. If a process systematically excludes all data that is negative to com-
21. See Aufderheide and Rich, supra note 2, at 311-313.
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pletion of a project, then it cannot be expected that the decision will be
fully rational nor that the project will develop as planned. "What the
banks are in some need of, from the environmentalists' perspective, is
glasnost."22
3. Participation of non-government organizations
NGOs are an important source of real life evidence of the effects of a
project on a region, nation, and indeed the planet. NGO participation is
important in more than political terms. It assures that a wide range of
real costs and benefits will be considered in determining the feasibility of
a project. Until recently the World Bank, like other MDBs, asserted that
it was inappropriate for it to communicate with NGOs because "the Bank
can talk only with governments." Ironically, there always existed a con-
stant flow of communication between MDBs and a large number of pri-
vate entities, particularly multinational construction firms, development
consultants, and representatives of regional development associations.
The integration of informed NGO participants into the development pro-
cess is a way to open a conduit of relevant information that is otherwise
typically excluded from development loan considerations.
4. Subsequent realistic audits
Projects as they are completed and put into operation should be sub-
ject to retrospective studies for determining the extent to which they ac-
tually realized the benefits posited and the extent to which diseconomies
and costs have created problems. Because the actual performance of dams
has been so problematic, there appears never to have been a comprehen-
sive accounting overview of the true costs and benefits of a completed
international dam project. The World Bank does prepare some retrospec-
tive project reports, but these are quite limited in the scope of accounted
costs and consequential effects. This hesitancy, environmentalists would
say, demonstrates an aversion to gathering the hard facts which might
reveal that other ongoing projects had better not be built. As a means of
mid-course correction and process feedback, retrospective audits are a
logical requirement of an ongoing successful development program.
5. External accountability
If it is difficult for a system to police itself, it is useful to have mecha-
nisms set up for outside observers to have an authoritative analytical role
in the process. Whether this be some form of judicial review, or economic
and social review tribunal, external accountability is one of the ways in
which the mistakes of the past can realistically be improved.
Those reformers who have been attempting to implement these func-
tional improvements in the MDB development loan system have been
skeptical of MDB reform from within, and rarely find it practical to focus
their efforts on intellectual persuasion. For their part, the MDBs have
22. Id. at 318.
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until recently responded inhospitably to the reform message. Over the
past decade, the most active efforts for environmental reforms in the
lending process have come from outside the institutional structure. In
Third World dam locations, for example, projects have been resisted
through strikes, demonstrations, sabotage, and human road blocks. These
efforts have often garnered publicity, have sometimes encouraged some
political re-evaluation of positions, but rarely have been successful in the
long term, and rarely have been able to present its positions in a compre-
hensively, articulated form. Some resistance to the current development
process has been in the nature of civil insurgencies. In other cases, there
have been political backlashes against development initiatives. In the de-
veloped nations some NGOs, not necessarily part of the MDB coalition
have staged media events in an attempt to embarrass the MDBs through
sit-ins, or hanging banners with embarrassing messages on the facades of
MDB headquarters.
If giving consideration to the problems and potential reforms of the
MDB development loan system is valuable, there must be more credible
means by which the system can integrate the merits of these pluralistic
points of view.
IV. LEGAL AVENUES FOR REFORM, AND THE QUESTION OF DONOR-NATION
PRESSURE
Faced with a situation poising MDB development interests and their
NGO critics at loggerheads, it is altogether desirable that some institu-
tionalized resolution of the issues be found within the legal system, rather
than in the protracted "eco-guerilla" actions in the Western media and
back country locations of Third World projects.
A. Evolving International Law Norms
The law, of course, operates in different ways in different arenas. At
the most general level, a reformation of the MDB lending process would
involve legal initiatives aimed at defining specifically applicable principles
of international law. Professor Paul has analyzed how the definition of
human rights in developing countries could provide a basis for MDBs to
reform the process by which they may disrupt and dispossess indigenous
populations in development areas.3 The dramatic human costs occa-
sioned by the World Bank's Narmada project, or the Balbina and Itapar-
ica projects in Brazil, might well provide a setting where such human
rights might be perceived as threatened. At this level, however, the defini-
tion of international law principles is quite abstract, and as yet provides
little practically applicable legal theory.
Some environmental activists have accordingly gone beyond the
broad definition of human rights to assert that in some cases MDB dam
23. Paul, supra note 8.
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projects have implemented "genocide" in their effect upon indigenous
peoples. If such a claim were substantiated, it could draw upon recog-
nized positive international law norms and conventions. Such claims of
genocide, however, represent an extremely drastic avenue for integrating
human costs into development planning. A genocide argument is not
likely to promote careful adjustment of interests, but rather invites in-
flexible polarization.
Other broad international principles might be found in international
declarations, such as the U.N. Declaration on the Human Environment
issued at Stockholm in 1972. In particular, Articles 13, 14, 15 and 25 of
that Declaration might arguably declare international law principles re-
quiring overall review and sensitivity to social and natural resource dis-
economies caused by development projects. Of course, the problem with
the Stockholm Declaration and other such general declarations is they
have no direct practical applicability and must await future specific im-
plementation by U.N. action, by treaty or convention.
B. International Conventions
Some existing conventions do offer potential applicability to the
problems posed by poorly conceived dam development projects. A fasci-
nating example occurred in the Narmada project. There, faced with mas-
sive dislocation of indigenous people and little planning for relocation
and mitigation of the effects on villages and tribal cultures, threatened
indigenous peoples formed a union under the auspices of the Interna-
tional Federation of Plantation and Agricultural Workers (IFPAW). In
October, 1985, the IFPAW filed a complaint with the International Labor
Organization in Geneva alleging multiple violations of Convention Article
107 of the International Labor Organization. Under the terms of that con-
vention, signatory nations including India are prohibited from taking de-
velopment actions which lower the living standard of indigenous peoples
or fail to supply them with equivalent cultivatable land. The ILO for-
warded those allegations to India, with an initial official expression of
concern that the convention was being violated. Faced with this ILO in-
quiry, both the government of India and the World Bank responded with
indignation to the international second-guessing of their plans for
Narmada. After several months of tense political negotiations, the ILO
was persuaded to withdraw from its review of the effects of the Narmada
project. Despite the fact that the ILO intervention was ultimately neu-
tralized, however, this initiative showed the potential utility of review and
pressure embodied in existing conventions, as well as the potent ability of
the development structure to resist such intervention.
C. Internal MDB Law
There exist within the MDBs several types of "law" which can effect
the implementation of reform in the development process. In 1980 all ma-
jor MDBs signed a "Declaration of Environmental Policies and Proce-
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dures Relating to Development", a general statement of commitment to
integrate environmental concerns into the development planning process.
Some MDBs, including the World Bank, took minor actions to implement
the declaration, including hiring of one or more environmentalists on
staff. " in general the actions of the MDBs amounted to little more than
symbolic gestures. A poll of the Bank's regional directors three years after
the signing showed that a significant number knew nothing of the exis-
tence of the Bank's environmental policy declaration.
Each MDB does have the potential to issue internal regulations and
guidelines that would assure implementation of analysis at effective
points in the decision-making process. Until recently, however, there was
evidently little interest in doing so. The concerns of environmental and
indigenous people's advocates were treated as minor marginal considera-
tions. Furthermore, there is "law" in each development loan itself, a sort
of project-by-project "law of the case". When an MDB negotiates a devel-
opment loan with a host country, it can write in whatever requirements it
wishes, and these requirements can apply tremendous constraints upon
host countries to assure that projects planned will not create human or
ecological destruction. Unfortunately, this potential is only as good as the
institutional motivation setting it into effect, and such incentive has been
hard to discern.
The World Bank can be applauded, however, for actions it has taken
in the past two years. On May 5, 1987, Chairman Barber Conable made a
formal address asserting that environmental considerations were not only
useful ideals to integrate into the planning process, but substantively
functional necessities to assure successful projects. "Good ecology", he
stated, "is good economics . . . If indeed the World Bank has been part of
the problem in the past, it can and will be a strong force in finding solu-
tions in the future."2 5 Conable's address was the first major change within
the World Bank's internal government and appears to have led to practi-
cal results. The Bapai Dam in Nepal appears to have been halted under
the review due to the chairman's address. From around the world, NGOs
and the environment ministers of host countries have reported that
World Bank staff and development interests within the particular coun-
tries have taken seriously for the first time the arguments, data, and envi-
ronmental accounting procedures. The Inter American Development
Bank has hired an environmental staff. The African Development Bank
also appears to have internalized the lesson that projects that create envi-
ronmental problems will often have an economic backlash that renders
major development loan initiatives nugatory. In the Itaparica Dam in
Brazil, the World Bank insisted that the "law of the project" include not
only promises on the part of the host country government that indigenous
24. In 1984 the Bank incorporated comprehensive policy declarations and procedures
into the Operations Manual. Yet these procedures seem to have been breached. President
Constable's Address, supra note 2.
25. Id.
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people would be adequately relocated, (assurances which in the past had
often turned out to be merely rhetorical,) but also that enforceable con-
tracts be made with local NGOs so that if relocation efforts were non-
existent or inadequate, the persons directly affected would have an imme-
diately available legal remedy in the courts of the host country.16
In the last two years the World Bank has implemented a major reor-
ganization, dividing its operations into four global regions with a central
directorate in Washington, D.C. In 1980, the World Bank had one ecolo-
gist on its entire world-wide staff. In May 1987 the World Bank had only
three environmental reviewers, trying to analyze 300 projects each year in
addition to their public relations duties." After the reorganization and
President Conable's environmental policy declaration of May 5, 1987, the
Bank created an Environmental Department in Washington, D.C. and en-
vironmental units in each region. Environmental guidelines and the Oper-
ations Manual have been updated, and a new sensitivity to environmental
diseconomies is evident.
Because of the inherent tensions between promotional momentum
and conservation principles, environmental observers are as skeptical as
ever about internal MDB reform efforts and have adopted a wait and see
attitude. "We like what they're saying," says one participant, "but we are
still seeing the same old stuff coming out at the end of the pipeline, espe-
cially in the energy sector. '2 8 They find hope in the fact that after years
of insistence that "the Bank will talk only to governments", the World
Bank has entered into active dialogues with the NGOs, including the es-
tablishment of a formal "World Bank - NGO Committee" to institution-
alize communication. 29
Noting the apparent dramatic shift in MDB environmental con-
sciousness, environmental observers nevertheless ponder why this shift
has occurred. In part the MDB's newfound recognition of the rational
26. There are reports that Electrosul, a state utility, has recently reneged on such a
promise. NOT MAN APART. supra note 2, at 7.
27. Deforestation, supra note 2, at 3.
28. Telephone interview with Dr. Brent Blackwelder (Nov. 30, 1988).
29. The following is from an affirmative speech to the Society for International Devel-
opment on April 22, 1988, by Moeen A. Qureshi, the Senior Vice President of Operations in
the World bank:
The doors of our headquarters and of our resident missions around the world
are open. We hope new partners for development and new allies against pov-
erty, will come to see us, even though World Bank staff seeks to find them ...
As late as ten years ago, what we knew about World Bank operations in many
countries depended mainly on bureaucratic lines of information and supervi-
sion. Within developing country-governments implementing agencies reported
on what they were doing, and country authorities tried to maintain quality
control. The Bank supervised the projects it financed, but within the Bank too,
we depended on bureaucratic lines of management ...
In today's global village, NGO networks can report a problem in rural Northeast Brazil to
Sao Paolo, and even throughout the world within a week. Where bureaucratic eyes are astig-
matic, NGO's provide vivid images of what is really happening at the grassroots level.
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importance of environmental accounting may be attributed to a signifi-
cant 1987 report of the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment.30 This "Brundtland Report" was available to President Conable in
draft form when he made his May 5th speech, prepared by a blue ribbon
international commission, (Mrs. Brundtland is the Prime Minister of
Norway and was among high ranking national officials from 22 nations;
the U.S. representative was William Ruckelshaus), which issued a strong
call for drastic changes in international environmental performance. The
report targeted international economic pressures and lending programs as
important causes of past problems, and indispensable parts of necessary
fundamental international environmental reforms.
While environmentalists may applaud the MDB initiatives they have
seen within the last two years, there remains a strong and not unreasona-
ble suspicion in the minds of many NGO observers that the dominating
reasons these reforms were implemented were due to outside forces. A
critical motivation for the World Bank's policy shift, beyond the intellec-
tual persuasions of the Brundtland commission's findings, appears to
have been a practical threat of statutory pressure on Bank appropria-
tions, and a subsequent barrage of pressures from donor nations, orches-
trated by the coalition of environmental NGOs.
D. Donor-Nation Pressure on MDB Policy
There is no accepted analysis of the status and legitimacy of donor-
nation pressure seeking to force particular policy initiatives upon interna-
tional lending organizations, but actions focussed on environmentalism
and indigenous peoples have recently created prime examples of this phe-
nomenon. An initial and quite dramatic example of such socio-ecological
pressure originated in a U.S. congressional initiative. Over the past ten
years, the United States NGO coalition has been increasingly successful
in persuading members of Congress that capital-intensive, multi-lateral
development projects may cause more problems than they solve.
The environmental coalition levied congressional financial pressures
on the MDBs drawing upon the tactics of a successful initiative against
commercial whaling which used U.S. statutes threatening import cutoffs
to pressure parties to the International Whaling Convention. Senator
Robert Kasten, Republican from Wisconsin and past chairman of the rel-
evant Senate appropriations subcommittee, emerged as a particularly im-
portant congressional figure in this initiative, which was backed by cur-
rent chairman Daniel Inouye and Rep. David Obey, who holds the
parallel position in the House. Over the last several fiscal years, Kasten
and Obey have attached an elaborate statutory provision to the annual
bill appropriating money for the World Bank. 1 These appropriations rid-
30. See e.g., Pub.L. No. 99-500, Title 1 sec. 161(f), 100 Stat. 1783-232 (1986).
31. BRUNDTLAND, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987). President Conable's public shift in pol-
icy followed shortly after a CBS "60 Minutes" excoriation of the Bank's Polonozoeste Pro-
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ers declared that the executive directors of MDBs who were appointed by
the U.S. must "vigorously promote the integration of environmental and
cultural assessments and protections in the processing of multilateral
loans," while attaching further requirements to enforce that goal. The
statutory language is detailed, contains very specific mandates and
prohibitions, and has been enforced by periodic accountings from the
Treasury, which through its IDCA and NAC is directly responsible for
briefing U.S. executive directors to the World Bank and other multilat-
eral development banks. The U.S. Congress has held 21 hearings on the
environmental problems of Bank lending over the past five years.3 2 Be-
cause of the pressure applied through U.S. legislation upon the Treasury
department, the U.S. representatives have undertaken critical reviews of
ongoing development loan proposals and in several cases have voted
against or abstained from loan approvals. Because the United States
wields such a major bloc of votes within the MDBs (voting being propor-
tionate to the financial sponsorship share of each nation), such actions
have created more than a mere symbolic stance, and have enforced upon
the World Bank the need to pay attention to the environmental princi-
ples the American statutes represent.
The pressures brought to bear upon the MDBs did not stop with the
U.S. initiatives. In the past two years there has been a growing number of
Western donor nations which have joined in with declarations of the
practical importance of environmental analyses in MDB lending, and di-
rect requests that the MDB boards incorporate environmental review into
a reformed development loan process. These pressures have come from
West Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian
countries. At recent Bank annual meetings in Berlin, Canada asked the
Board of Directors to implement an environmental impact statement re-
view procedure for all development construction loan projects.
The NGO coalition, in sum, has helped to marshal a wide range of
external donor nation pressures upon the MDB lending process, and can
be credited with a fair measure of whatever successes flow from the ongo-
ing MDB reforms.
E. The Propriety of Donor Nation Pressure on MDBs
Even assuming that salutary environmental reforms were instigated
because of donor-nation pressure, the use of direct pressure on an inter-
national compact entity raises worrisome concerns in some observers'
minds. No matter how altruistic, certain nations have the ability to influ-
ence the MDBs in part because they possess financial leverage on the
Bank board. What then is the propriety of a donor nation's applying di-
ject. See Deforestation, supra note 2, at 1.
32. By statute, the Agency for International Development in the U.S. Department of
State is required to publish a biannual list of MDB projects that confront environmental
problems, as an "early warning system". Aufderheide and Rich, supra note 2 at 309-310.
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rect pressure to lending decisions of the Bank? The question is presented
with particular clarity in the recent U.S. environmental initiative since
the U.S. Congress applied its pressure via direct statutory enactment (al-
though the same issue is present in less formal interventions.) For pur-
poses of analysis, let us take two separable types of formal, unilateral do-
nor-nation action: first, the Kasten-type appropriations situation where
specific directions are given to a country's Executive Director on the
Bank board to cast votes or to refrain from voting on particular issues.
Second is the further troubling possibility of direct economic threats -
the threatened withdrawal of funding to the World Bank tied to condi-
tions of Bank action or inaction on particular loans and particular issues.
This second category of pressure, moreover, may be further separated
into threats designed merely to withhold extensions or commitments for
further funding for the Bank, and a more drastic form of statutory condi-
tion cutting off appropriations for previously agreed funding commit-
ments meeting existing Bank quota obligations.
There is a spectrum of arguments to be applied to both categories of
unilateral donor pressures on MDBs: at one extreme are the opinions of
those members of Congress who attach policy conditions to appropria-
tions bills. Succinctly stated by Senator Kasten's office,3" it is always the
right of a sovereign people to determine how their tax dollars are going to
be spent. If the legislature attaches directive conditions to its funding
bills, or threatens a cut-off based on a particular policy position, that is
an intrinsic right of a democratic people. The office of Senator Steven
Symms of Idaho echoes the same position.34 If World Bank loans in the
agricultural and mining sector create Third World competitors for Idaho
farmers and mining corporations, it is appropriate for a member of Con-
gress to attempt to limit the effects of World Bank-financed competition
through appropriations riders.
As recently as the Foreign Aid Appropriations Act for fiscal 1989,
Senator Symms prepared conditional amendments, that stopped short of
a retroactive cut-off of committed funds.35 One amendment provided that
if a loan designed to produce debt service revenue was approved by the
Bank over the dissent of the American representative, future U.S. com-
mitments of funds to the Bank would be reduced proportionately. No
such amendments have passed the Congress, however. (The Treasury de-
33. Telephone interview with staff member in the office of Senator Robert Kasten
(January 4, 1988).
34. Telephone interview with staff member in the office of Senator Steven Symms
(November, 4, 1988).
35. See Amendment to the Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill for Fiscal 1989, adopted
on the Senate floor, 133 CONG. REC. S9270 (daily ed. July 7, 1987) and the debate thereupon
(subsequently removed from the statute as passed). The congressional offices make the fur-
ther point that, since Bank loans are based on borrowing from commercial banks, and not
merely upon appropriations granted by member states, the withdrawal of funds is not a
direct undercutting of the Bank's lending programs. At the most, it might cause the bond
rating of the Bank to drop, requiring higher interest rates, but lending could continue.
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partment, which instructs the U.S. MDB representatives, has announced
that it views such amendments as violations of international legal com-
mitments and hinted strongly that the agency would argue for a veto in
such a case. For its part, the World Bank has made it clear that it would
not accept any grant of funds from a member state if such conditions
were attached.)
At the other end of the spectrum is the quite skeptical position taken
by Dr. Ibrahim Shihata, Vice-President and General Counsel of the
World Bank. In his speech to the International Third World Legal Stud-
ies Association in Miami, 6 and in memoranda prepared within the Bank
in other similar controversies, Dr. Shihata has argued eloquently that all
such unilateral threats or suasions applied by donor nations were im-
proper and contra legem under international agreements, unless the pol-
icy conditions were directly related to the economic integrity of the Bank
and its loans to member states. Going back to cases arising in the early
1970's and earlier, Dr. Shihata has argued that both Article IV, section 10
and article V, section 5(c) of the Bank's charter prohibit such direct in-
terference. Article V provides:
[Tihe President, officers and staff of the Bank in the discharge of
their offices, owe their duty to the Bank and to no other authority.
Each member of the Bank shall respect the international character of
this duty and shall refrain from all attempts to influence any [officers]
in the discharge of their duties.
Article IV adds that in the deliberation of the Bank and its officers,
[O]nly economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions,
and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to
achieve the purposes stated in Article 1 [setting forth the productive
development mandate of the World Bank]. 7
Dr. Shihata said these conclusions "clearly indicate that, as a general
principle, the Bank, including its Executive Directors, may not take into
account political considerations."3 Based on the articles above, Dr.
Shihata has concluded that member [states] of the Bank are under an
obligation not to influence the Bank's President and staff in the discharge
of their duties, and Executive Directors are under the duty not to act as
the instrumentality of member [states] to exert such prohibited influence.
However, Dr. Shihata also "recognized that there was no legal sanction
available to challenge a vote by an Executive Director which is motivated
36. This was in conjunction with the AALS annual meeting in Miami Beach, Florida
on January 8, 1988. See Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the
Legal Issues and the Record of Achievements, 17 DEN. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 39 (1988).
37. Id.
38. Prohibitions of Political Activities Under the International Bank of Reconstruc-
tion and Development Articles of Agreement and Its Relevance to the Work of the Execu-
tive Directors, sec. M87-1409, at 8 (December 23, 1987)(unpublished World Bank docdment
available at World Bank headquarters).
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by political considerations."
One fundamental proposition of Dr. Shihata's argument is that con-
straints like environmental or human rights accounting are political. He
specifically recognizes that in some circumstances "there are political sit-
uations which have effects on the country's economy or on the feasibility
of project implementation or monitoring which should be taken into ac-
count." 9 Insofar as there can be established a direct or indirect link be-
tween the environmental consequences of a loan and the ability of the
nation to repay it, that economic nexus would justify such "political" in-
tervention. As a general proposition, however, the argument stakes out a
strong presumptive position against the propriety and legality of such
"political" interference by any member state in the activities of the Board
of Directors. Dr. Shihata's position is echoed by the foreign investment
committee of the American Branch of the International Law Association.
That committee recently released a report strongly condemning efforts by
certain signatories of international agreements, specifically the United
States as a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA), attaching statutory conditions to participatory activities under
the MIGA international convention.
The Committee believes that such a unilateral directive to a multilat-
eral economic institution ... will be unacceptable to the other parties
to the Convention. They will question the right of one nation to dic-
tate to the Agency that the nation's [interests] must be protected...
at the expense of other signatory nations. If these conditions are re-
quired, U.S. participation in this multilateral Agency will be barred
[sic] and [the Convention] would effectively be destroyed."'
Lying somewhere between these two positions is the opinion of sev-
eral MDB legal counselors who informally expressed a fundamental prag-
matism about such donor-nation pressures on international lending. A
"whole host of appropriations riders" has been attached to recent U.S.
funding statutes, and according to an informal World Bank source, the
Bank has implicitly taken the position that such pressure is appropriate
since it merely involves guidance to a national representative by its mem-
ber state. Critical to the middle of the road position lies a modification of
Dr. Shihata's fundamental distinction. If indeed the Bank's Executive Di-
rectors are legally to be regarded as individuals deriving their authority
from and owing their paramount loyalty to the Bank, (Shihata argues)
rather than as representatives of their appointive or elective member
states, then political pressure exerted upon them is improper and the
scope of permissible "economic-linked" political pressure is narrowed
concomitantly. The pressures of a particular national special interest un-
dercuts the required dominance of the collective international enterprise.
39. Id.
40. Committee on Foreign Investment (American Branch) International Law Associa-
tion (chaired by David G. Gill), "Report" (Oct. 15, 1987).
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If, on the other hand, one regards and accepts the status of Executive
Directors as delegates representing the position of the states that put
them on the Board, then many instances of donor-nation pressure upon
MDBs become less troublesome, and less destructive of the international
agreement underlying the MDB process. Such recognition de-escalates
the latent tension represented by an alleged nonfunctional "violation" of
international agreement, in effect rationalizing reality.
Political reality indicates that some unilateral pressure on MDBs is
inevitable and will take place regardless of whether pressure is formal or
informal, direct or indirect, linked to economic concerns or not. The ini-
tial choice of an Executive Director is guided to some degree by the char-
acter and political predilections of the appointee, and to consider that
political communication in this modern age would be limited only to dis-
cussions prior to appointment ignores modern international political real-
ity. From this middle perspective, the application of pressure to the ap-
pointees of member states, or to the elected representatives of blocks of
member states, is perhaps best regarded with a shrug. In any event, the
compromise position would note that the donor nation directives are not
an attempt to bind the MDB organization as such.
It follows, according to the middle position, that the only case where
donor-nation political interference with lending decisions becomes "con-
tra legem" is the situation where the prior commitment of a member
state to contribute a specified amount of money is unilaterally rescinded
in whole or part according to various political conditions. In such a case, a
prior binding international agreement is being unilaterally abrogated. In
other situations, including conditional refusals to commit further supple-
mentary contributions, a member state is merely exercising its right to
contract or to decline to contract. An example of the latter phenomenon
occurred when the U.S. Congress passed P.L. 98-191 in November of
1983, with instructions to Executive Directors to refrain completely from
voting unless the representatives had consulted with and received ap-
proval from appropriate Senate committees. Even this type of continuing
stringent condition was arguably proper because it was attached to a reso-
lution agreeing to increase the quota for contribution to the Bank, a fi-
nancial undertaking that had not been previously agreed to.
Once consent is given it is binding, and unilateral withdrawals or
rescissions are not appropriate after a commitment has been made. Short
of such action, however, unilateral pressure is as pragmatically acceptable
as it is inevitable."1 "The whole world is political; the whole world is eco-
nomic"; and it is therefore unrealistic to expect political pressure not to
occur. It is possible to argue that most political intervention can be found
to be indirectly linked to concerns about the "economic" ability of the
41. See also, J. Gold, The Growing Role of the IMF's Stand-By Arrangement, 1984 J.
Bus. L. 308, 315 (1984).
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debtor nation to repay a development loan."
From the pragmatic middle perspective, the further forms of horta-
tory donor-nation environmental pressure that have been applied to
MDBs by Canada, West Germany, the Scandinavian countries and
others, are not at all inappropriate. The World Bank is a major actor in
the Third World, created and funded primarily by developed Western na-
tions. What happens ecologically, economically, and sociopolitically in the
Third World inevitably affects world order and the diverse interests of
the developed states.
The most problematic legal situation, then, would be presented by
unilateral rescissions of prior existing commitments to the Bank not the
bare fact of political pressure on bank lending decisions. Even in such
cases, it is true, the Bank has no enforcement mechanism, and it is ques-
tionable to what extent it would seek formal legal redress. As so often in
international law, the resolution of such controversies would come down
to a very basic question of internationalism. If the political actor deems
domestic political and legal considerations to be dominant over interna-
tional commitments, there is no effective constraint except the burden of
world opinion - that of member states and the international legal profes-
sion. Most states have clearly accepted the doctrines of internationalism
in their concept of law. Absent radical domestic political changes, it ap-
pears that doctrines of state sovereignty will usually not be applied casu-
ally to abrogate international development commitments.
SUMMARY
From the foregoing discussion it can be asserted that large interna-
tional development projects, like the construction of dams in tropical ar-
eas of the Third World, present a wide range of troubling consequences
that have often been systematically and disastrously excluded from prior
planning efforts and MDB lending procedures. The failure of the interna-
tional development loan process to review and understand the many seri-
ous diseconomies caused by such dam projects is attributable at least in
part to completely understandable internal institutional dynamics. An in-
stitution that is geared up towards large capital-intensive projects may
find it counterproductive and motivationally unattractive to consider rea-
sons for such projects not to be built.
The environmental movement has applied much political pressure
upon MDBs over the past decade, largely without success until the mid-
42. In the case of the Chilean loans, the U.S. government has required its representa-
tives to dissent form development loans so long as the regime continues to violate human
rights. Yet, World Bank staffers have generally seemed to take a non-committal position,
refusing to condemn this stance officially as a violation of international law or internal Bank
Articles. This apathetic attitude may reflect an implicit interpretation of the U.S. pressures
as linked to "economic" matters. It may even reflect a more straightforward recognition that
major states' representatives will use political considerations and there is nothing the Bank
can do about it.
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1980's, attempting to reform the lending process that has produced a se-
ries of disasters in international water development. In the last two years
the World Bank and other MDBs have made major procedural reforms
within their internal processes designed to address the problem of envi-
ronmental diseconomies in their projects. To outward appearances, this
major change of heart on the part of the MDBs can be attributed in at
least significant part to the pressure applied under NGO prodding by do-
nor nations, including direct unilateral mandates to directors, requiring
environmental reviews and standards in the MDB lending process, with
the implicit potential for funding threats in the future.
The external pressure of donor nations presents a tangible and per-
suasive catalyst to the internal reform of MDB institutions. Such pres-
sure, however, raises some questions about the propriety and even legality
of the phenomenon, irrespective of the arguably salutary changes it may
work in the implementation of international lending. From the perspec-
tive of jurists sensitive to the development of international legal norms, it
is at least troubling that such a phenomenon has no inherent limits. In
the short run, environmental observers will say that important sets of en-
vironmental considerations are now being considered where before they
might never have been. The health of the planet may thus continue to
benefit from the efforts of the 1980's. Debates about the proper relation-
ship between MDBs and individual donor states - and between previ-
ously-insulated MDBs and the growing consensus about their broader in-
ternational responsibilities - are likewise likely to continue into the
future.
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